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BANKING LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1990
by
Peter G. Weinstock*
This is the first year the survey has devoted a chapter solely to financial
institutions law. This topic makes its debut during the most extensive re-
structuring of the banking industry since the Great Depression. Although
this chapter is devoted to legal issues arising in the State of Texas, in light of
the economic developments in the state's banking industry, such issues have
assumed a national significance. In each of the last three years, Texas has
led the nation in bank failures; and overall, nine of the state's ten largest
bank holding companies have been acquired. Moreover, the most notewor-
thy transactions under the Southwest Plan involved savings and loan as-
sociations domiciled in the State of Texas. Perhaps most significantly, the
demands such events have placed on the decades-old system of Federal-de-
posit insurance led to the enactment, on August 9, 1989, of the Financial
Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).1
These developments have spawned case law precedents for the remainder of




The deteriorating financial condition of MCorp, Inc. (MCorp) resulted in
two significant decisions during the survey period. In MCorp v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2 the bankruptcy court considered a
conflict between the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the dictates of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Federal
Reserve).
On March 27, 1989, MCorp filed for bankruptcy. 3 Two days later,4 the
regulatory authorities closed all but five of MCorp's twenty-five bank subsid-
* The author is a member of the Financial Institutions Section of Jenkens & Gilchrist,
P.C. The author lectures and writes frequently on topics concerning financial institutions.
1. Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, § 212, 103 Stat. 183, 222 (1989).
2. 1990 WL 52582 (5th Cir. (Tex.)), - F.2d -. This decision considered the jus-
ticiability doctrine of exhaustion of remedies as well as the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
over bank holding companies.
3. Court Tells Fed to Go to Bankruptcy Court to Enforce Actions Against MCorp, [Jan.-
June] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 52, at 1289 (June 12, 1989).
4. Id.
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iaries. 5 Contemporaneously, the Federal Reserve commenced two adminis-
trative actions against MCorp. In the first action, the Federal Reserve
alleged that MCorp violated the Federal Reserve's Source of Strength Policy
Statement. This policy statement provides that bank holding companies are
required to serve as a "source of strength" to their subsidiary banks.6 The
violation reputedly arose because MCorp had failed to inject over $400 mil-
lion7 in cash, which it then held at the holding company level, into its sub-
sidiary banks. The Federal Reserve sought to require MCorp to devise a
capital plan that would provide for all of MCorp's assets to be used to recap-
italize its subsidiary banks.8 In the second action, the Federal Reserve al-
leged that MCorp violated Section 23A9 of the Federal Reserve Act (the
statute restricting transactions between a bank and its affiliates). The alleged
violation arose when the former MBank Houston and MBank Preston made
"unsecured extensions of credit" 10 to MBank Management, a nonbank sub-
sidiary of MCorp.
MCorp sought to avail itself of the protections afforded debtors under the
Bankruptcy Code in order to avoid the Federal Reserve's assessment of ad-
ministrative penalties. Specifically, MCorp contended that the bankruptcy
court possessed exclusive jurisdiction over all property of MCorp. More-
over, MCorp asserted that either the automatic stay in bankruptcy barred
actions against MCorp's estate or, if the Federal Reserve were exempt from
the automatic stay, that MCorp was entitled to an injunction to protect its
property. The district court agreed and held that the bankruptcy action had
precedence over the Federal Reserve's administrative proceeding." The
court stated that such a result did not preclude the Federal Reserve from
5. 1990 WL at 52586.
6. Policy Statement: Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of
Strength to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707-08 (1987) [hereinafter Source of
Strength Policy Statement]. For a discussion of the Source of Strength Policy Statement, see
Weinstock, "Source of Strength" Policy May Weaken Holding Companies, 171 The Bankers
Magazine May-June 1988, at 34.
7. MCorp Assets in Tug-of-War, Dallas Morn. News, October 18, 1988 at ID, col. 10.
8. 1990 WL at 52586.
9. Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act and its companion provision § 23B govern
transactions between a bank and its affiliates. Among other things, § 23A restricts the aggre-
gate amount of transactions with both any one affiliate or all affiliates together as a percentage
of capital and requires extensions of credit by a bank to an affiliate to be secured by collateral
with a market value equal to at least 100 percent of the loan amount. For a general discussion
of this topic see Weinstock, Transactions with Affiliates: Outline of Section 23A and New Sec-
tion 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, [Jan.-June] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 52, at 387 (Feb. 13,
1989).
10. The Federal Reserve Banks impute an extension of credit from a bank to its holding
company whenever the holding company has received a benefit for which such Federal Re-
serve Bank believes the bank was not sufficiently compensated. Imputing an "extension of
credit" would cause a violation of Section 23A because such credit would be unsecured. 12
U.S.C. § 371c (c).
11. The district court enjoined the Federal Reserve's administrative process. 101 Bankr.
483 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989). The court noted that MCorp's reorganization could be jeopar-
dized if it were required to defend both the Federal Reserves administrative action and the
parallel bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 487. Moreover, the court stated that the bankruptcy
court is intended to possess authority over all of the debtor's assets in order to provide for an
effective reorganization plan. Id.
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raising its claims in the bankruptcy court forum.12
On appeal, the Federal Reserve asserted that 12 U.S.C. § 1881(i)13 pro-
vided it with exclusive jurisdiction over regulatory actions until a final order
is issued. Alternatively, the Federal Reserve argued that actions of bank
regulators were not the type of actions that section 1334(b)1 4 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code was intended to enjoin.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that section 1334(b) only
provides the bankruptcy court with concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction.
The court stated that "the [Federal Reserve] Board has not sought control
over the property of MCorp's estate... [,but] only the opportunity to go
forward in its administrative proceedings." Is Accordingly, "the plain lan-
guage of Section 1818(i) deprive[d] the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin
the [Federal Reserve] Board's administrative proceedings if the Board's ac-
tions [did] not exceed the authority Congress granted to it." 16
MCorp asserted three respects in which the Federal Reserve's administra-
tive action exceeded its statutory authority: (i) the Federal Reserve lacked
authority over MCorp's relationship with MCorp's former bank subsidiaries
under FDIC receivership, (ii) the Federal Reserve was using an alleged vio-
lation of Section 23A as a pretext to assist the FDIC Receiver to obtain
damages, and (iii) the Source of Strength Policy Statement lacked any statu-
tory foundation.17
The MCorp court addressed each of these arguments in turn. The court
stated that the Federal Reserve was entitled to determine whether transac-
12. Apparently, the FDIC heard the district court's message to bring any claims it might
have in the bankruptcy forum. After the district court decision, the FDIC filed a claim in
MCorp's bankruptcy proceeding for $847 million. FDIC Seeking $847 Million from MCorp,
Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1989, at AS, col. 1. Among other reasons, the FDIC's claim was based
upon actions MCorp or its remaining subsidiaries engaged in that harmed the banks for which
the FDIC was appointed receiver and thus increased the resolution costs of such banks. In
addition, Bank One, Texas, N.A., the bridge bank that acquired the former MCorp subsidiary
banks from the FDIC as receiver (the FDIC Receiver), filed a claim for over $557 million
against MCorp for, among other. things, alleged overpayment of dividends to MCorp and
MCorp's allegedly improper acquisition of trust operations from its bank subsidiaries. Bridge
Bank Seeks $557 Million from MCorp Companies, Failed Bank & Thrift Litigation Rep., Sept.
27, 1989, at 10,259.
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) (1988) provides:
The appropriate Federal banking agency may in its discretion apply to the
United States district court... within the jurisdiction of which the home office
of the bank is located, for the enforcement of any effective and outstanding no-
tice or order issued under [§ 1818], and such courts shall have jurisdiction and
power to order and require compliance herewith; but except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or
otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or
to review, modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or order. (em-
phasis added).
14. Section 1334(b) provides:
Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have origi-
nal but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11,
or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
15. MCorp v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, 1990 WL at 52593.




tions between the failed MBanks and MCorp Management were impermissi-
ble. On the Section 23A issue, the court stated that the Federal Reserve
possesses the authority to require MCorp to take aflirmative action to rem-
edy a violation of that statute. The court then turned to the validity of the
Source of Strength Policy Statement.
The Federal Reserve asserted that Sections 3(a) and (c)18 and 5(b) 19 of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (the Bank Holding Company Act) pro-
vided the authority upon which the Source of Strength Policy Statement was
based. Section 3(a) of the Bank Holding Company Act requires the Federal
Reserve's prior approval of a company's application to acquire a bank or a
company that controls a bank. Section 3(c) requires the Federal Reserve to
consider, among other things, the prospects for and the resources of the
bank involved. Section 5(b) permits the Federal Reserve to issue such orders
as are necessary to enable it to effect the purposes of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act. The Federal Reserve also noted that it possesses the authority to
cause a bank holding company to cease and desist an "unsafe or unsound
practice." 20
The court held that "[t]he Bank Holding Company Act does not grant the
Board authority to consider the financial and managerial soundness of the
subsidiary banks, after it approves the application" to acquire control over a
bank.21 In addition, the court stated that the Federal Reserve does not pos-
sess authority to regulate the day-to-day affairs of subsidiary banks. 22 The
court also noted that section 5(b) is not an independent grant of authority,
but, instead only permits the Federal Reserve to enforce the provisions of the
Bank Holding Company Act. Lastly, the court considered whether the
Source of Strength Policy Statement was based on the Federal Reserve's
authority to remedy unsafe or unsound practices by bank holding compa-
nies.23 The court noted that:
Generally speaking an 'unsafe or unsound practice' encompasses any
18. Section 3(a) and (c) of the Bank Holding Company Act provide:
(a) It shall be unlawful, except with the prior approval of the Board, (1) for any
action to be taken that causes any company to become a bank holding company
(c) [When reviewing an application to become a bank holding company,] the
Board shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources and
future prospects of the company or companies and the banks concerned, and the
convenience and needs of the community to be served.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) and (c) (1988).
19. Section 5(b) of the Bank Holding Company Act provides: "The Board is authorized
to issue such regulations and orders as may be necessary to enable it to administer and carry
out the purposes of this chapter and prevent evasions thereof." 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b).
20. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) and (3) (1988).
21. 1990 WL at 52598-99.
22. Id. at 52599 (citing Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234
(1978)).
23. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also addressed the Federal Reserve's con-
tention that judicial review of the Federal Reserves action was not ripe until after the adminis-
trative process had been exhausted. The court stated that exhaustion of remedies was not
necessary because there were no factual issues in dispute. Id. at 52595. Thus, the court implic-
itly characterized the question of whether an action was "unsafe or unsound" as a legal issue.
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action, or lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted stan-
dards of prudent operation, the possible consequences of which, if con-
tinued, would be abnormal risk of loss or damage to an institution, its
shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance funds.24
The court stated that requiring MCorp to make a capital injection of its
funds would require MCorp to disregard its own separate corporate status.25
This would constitute a wasting of corporate assets and a breach of duty to
MCorp's shareholders. Congress, in adopting Section 23A of the Federal
Reserve Act, specifically defined the permissible relationship between banks
and their affiliates, including their parent holding companies. Congress,
however, never mandated that holding companies inject capital into their
subsidiary banks. The court noted that Congress empowered the bank regu-
lators to issue capital directives to the institutions under their supervision,
but did not provide the Federal Reserve with the authority to issue such
directives to bank holding companies. The court decided that a bank hold-
ing company's failure to inject its resources into a subsidiary bank is not an
unsafe or unsound practice. Thus, the court dispatched each of the Federal
Reserve's asserted bases of statutory authority. Consequently, the Federal
Reserve exceeded its powers when it adopted the Source of Strength Policy
Statement.26
The MCorp decision has eliminated the Federal Reserve's asserted author-
ity to mandate that existing bank holding companies use their available re-
sources to recapitalize their subsidiary banks. Management and the
directors of bank holding companies have now regained the discretion to
allocate corporate resources in a manner that will preserve the most value
for shareholders. Not only did the court invalidate the Source of Strength
Policy Statement, but it stated that the Federal Reserve lacks the authority
to consider, outside the application context, the managerial and financial
condition of subsidiary banks. It is now an open question whether the Fed-
eral Reserve can require bank holding companies to take affirmative action
to remedy any problems experienced by their subsidiary banks.
The court suggested an alternative for the Federal Reserve to use to re-
place the now defunct Source of Strength Policy Statement. The court noted
in a footnote2 7 that the Federal Reserve could require applicants to execute a
capital maintenance agreement as a condition of regulatory approval for a
company to acquire a bank. The court observed that such agreements were
a prerequisite for an acquisition of a thrift.28 It would not be surprising if
the Federal Reserve heeds the court's passing comment, and begins requir-
ing capital maintenance agreements for new applications. Regardless, the
Federal Reserve's authority over existing holding companies has been signifi-
cantly reduced.
Since MCorp filed for bankruptcy, other financial institution holding com-
24. 1990 WL at 52599-600.
25. Id. at 52600.
26. Id. at 52601.
27. Id. at 52601 n.5.
28. Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 574.7(a)(2) and (3)).
1990]
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panies not only followed MCorp's lead, but have sought to prevent the regu-
lators from closing their subsidiaries while the holding company was in
bankruptcy. One institution has been able to prevent the FDIC from taking
action regarding its savings and loan association subsidiary.29
2. Exhaustion of Remedies
Another significant issue decided during this survey period concerns the
adjudicative powers of the deposit insurance corporations. The United
States Supreme Court, in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC,30 held
that the Hudspeth rule,31 which required creditors of an insolvent savings
and loan association to exhaust the administrative process established by the
FSLIC before they sought limited review of the FSLIC's determination in
court, was insupportable in law.32
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hudspeth had held that the
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the
FSLIC as receiver (FSLIC Receiver) for an insolvent savings and loan asso-
ciation33 because the FSLIC was deemed to possess exclusive jurisdiction
over such causes of action.34 Furthermore, claimants against FSLIC Re-
ceiver can only appeal to the district court once they exhausted the adminis-
trative process. 35 Claimants who make it to court can only cause an adverse
decision by the FSLIC to be overturned if such decision were arbitrary and
capricious. 36
In Coit Independence Joint Venture (Coit)37, Coit brought suit against
FirstSouth, F.A. (FirstSouth), a federal savings and loan association for,
among other things, usury and breach of contract. Subsequently, the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board (the FHLBB) declared FirstSouth insolvent
and appointed the FSLIC as receiver. Thereafter, FSLIC Receiver was sub-
stituted for FirstSouth and, upon the FSLIC's motion, the case was dis-
missed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. 38 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the circuits. 39
The United States Supreme Court stated that Congress did not intend to
29. Court Decision May Help S&Ls Put OffRTC, Am. Bankr., Oct. 31, 1989, at 2, col. 4
(Deltacorp sought an injunction to prevent the regulators from seizing its subsidiary, Colonial
Savings Bank of New Rochelle, N.J.).
30. 27 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) % 87,616, at 94,751 (Mar. 24, 1989).
31. The Hudspeth rule was originally promulgated in North Mississippi Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
32. 27 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,616, at 94,751.
33. 756 F.2d at 1103.
34. Id. at 1102-03.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,616, at 94,751.
38. Id. at 94,753.
39. Id. at 94,754. The conflict between the circuits developed when the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held, in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th
Cir. 1987), that FSLIC lacked exclusive authority over claims against FSLIC Receiver. 27
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 87,616, at 94,754.
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grant the FSLIC exclusive jurisdiction to resolve claims.4° The Supreme
Court noted that the Hudspeth decision was based, in part, upon two statu-
tory provisions-12 U.S.C. § 1729(d)41 and 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C).42
The Supreme Court interpreted these provisions differently than the Fifth
Circuit had in Hudspeth. The Supreme Court stated that receivers tradition-
ally possess the power "to 'settle, compromise, or release' claims," but that
such authority is distinguishable from, and to some degree inconsistent with,
the power to adjudicate claims.43 The Court noted that if FSLIC Receiver
possessed the authority to adjudicate claims, it would possess little incentive
to compromise and settle claims." The Supreme Court also stated that the
limited scope of 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(c) is to prohibit both untimely chal-
lenges to the appointment of the receiver and attempts to enjoin the receiver-
ship functions.45 In addition, the Court declared that adjudication of claims
whether by the FSLIC or by the district courts would not restrain the re-
ceiver's operations.46 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that creditors are
entitled to a de novo hearing of their claims by a district court.47 The
Supreme Court did not need to address Coit's constitutional arguments be-
cause it determined that the statutory authority for the Hudspeth rule did
not authorize the FSLIC to adjudicate claims against the receivership.48
The Supreme Court then considered whether claimants against FSLIC
Receiver must exhaust the FSLIC's administrative process before bringing
suit in district court. The Court decided that the statutory mandate for
resolving insolvent savings and loan associations could extend to authorizing
a process requiring claimants to notify the FSLIC Receiver of their claim
and provide the FSLIC Receiver with a reasonable time, before suit may be
filed, to determine what course of action to pursue to resolve such claims.49
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the specific process established by
the FHLBB exceeded its statutory authority and was flawed for two rea-
sons.50 First, the FHLBB's regulations attempted to empower the FSLIC
40. 27 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 87,616, at 94,756.
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1988) provided:
[FSLIC] shall have power to carry on the business of and to collect all obliga-
tions to the insured institutions, to settle, compromise, or release claims in favor
of or against the insured institutions, and to do all other things that may be
necessary in connection therewith, subject only to the regulation of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, or, ... other public authority having jurisdiction over
the matter .... (emphasis added).
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(c) (1988) provided: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
subsection, no court may take any action for or toward the removal of any conservator or
receiver, or, except at the instance of the Board [FHLBB], restrain or affect the exercise of
powers or functions of a conservator or receiver." (emphasis added).
43. 27 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 87,616, at 94,756 (quoting Morrison-Knudson Co.
Inc. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1219 (9th Cir. 1987)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 94,757.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Supreme Court also noted in dictum that the claims asserted by Coit were t~he
type traditionally reserved for consideration by an Article III judge. Id. at 94,758.




to adjudicate claims that purportedly could not be reviewed by a court on a
de novo basis.5' Second, such regulations failed to restrict the duration of
the FSLIC's review process.52 The Court noted that Coit's claim already
had been under consideration by the FSLIC for thirteen months without the
FSLIC even making an initial determination of liability.53 As a result, Coit's
claims could become barred by the statute of limitations without Coit ever
receiving any judicial consideration of its claims.5 4 In addition, the lack of a
deadline for resolution of claims could cause claimants to settle in situations
in which they might otherwise not be so inclined. 55 The Court concluded
that a claimant is not required to exhaust a process that is inadequate.5 6
Accordingly, the Court decided that there could be a FSLIC review process,
but that the then-current system was impermissible. 57
FIRREA authorizes the FDIC to establish an administrative process for
consideration of claims against an insolvent financial institution." Essen-
tially, under FIRREA, the FDIC could require an initial administrative de-
termination of claims against insolvent financial institutions.59 Thereafter,
the claimant could bring suit, on a de novo basis, in district court or request
an administrative review of the FDIC's initial determination. 6°
To date, the FDIC has not promulgated regulations providing for an ad-
ministrative review of claims. As discussed below, after Coit overruled
Hudspeth but before FIRREA was adopted, the FSLIC sought to dispose of
claims against the receivership estate on a summary basis. Accordingly,
during this period, the FSLIC continued to move for summary judgment in
such cases, but shifted the theoretical basis for such motions from exhaus-
tion of remedies to mootness. The success the FSLIC achieved in disposing
of claims against receiverships based on mootness may have obviated the
FDIC's desire to institute its own regulatory process for resolving claims
against its receiverships.
3. Mootness
In the typical purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions involving sav-
ings and loan associations in the State of Texas, deposit liabilities and se-








58. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212, 103 Stat. 183, 222 (1989).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The FDIC or the FSLIC, in their receivership capacities, do not honor every claim
against the assets of an insolvent financial institution. Prior to FIRREA, the FDIC would
honor claims against a failed financial institution in accordance with the depositor preference
statute contained in the Texas Banking Code of 1943, as amended (Texas Banking Code). Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 342-803a (Vernon 1990). The depositor preference statute provides a
hierarchy of classes of claims against a failed financial institution's assets. Id. Before any
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by a new healthy institution, which also purchases certain of the institution's
assets. The FSLIC Corporate provides purchasers with funds in order to
equalize the amount of the assets being purchased and the liabilities being
assumed, in exchange for which, the FSLIC Corporate receives the assets
that were not purchased. The unsecured claims are not assumed because
such claims would not be honored in a liquidation. Thus, the unsecured
creditors are left with a claim against an institution totally devoid of assets.
A number of courts have dismissed these remaining unsecured claims
against the FSLIC Receiver on the basis that even if such claims should
prove to be successful, the receivership estate will never possess any assets
with which to satisfy such claims.62
In FSLIC v. Locke,63 the FSLIC Corporate sued Larry Locke (Locke) to
collect on four promissory notes purchased from the FSLIC as receiver for
State Federal Savings and Loan Association (State Savings); Locke counter-
claimed. The district court granted summary judgment to the FSLIC Cor-
porate on the grounds that each of Locke's claims was precluded by either
the D'Oench Duhme doctrine" or mootness.65
On December 19, 1985, the FHLBB declared State Savings insolvent and
appointed the FSLIC as receiver. The regulatory authorities chartered a
new association-State Federal Savings and Loan Association (New State).
Thereafter, FSLIC Receiver sold substantially all the assets of State Savings,
including the Locke notes, to New State. In June 1986, New State and
Locke negotiated a renewal of the notes with a provision for additional ad-
vances to Locke. In their pleadings, the parties disagreed regarding whether
they had ever reached a definitive agreement. New State contended that
Locke never met its conditions for renewing and restructuring the loan.
claims of a creditor in a lower class may be paid, the claims of all creditors in the preceding
class must be honored in full. Id. If the claims of creditors in any class cannot be paid in full,
such claims are paid on a pro rata basis from the assets remaining after paying the claims of
creditors in the preceding class, yielding nothing for creditors of the remaining lower classes.
Id.
The depositor preference statute prefers the claims of depositors and secured creditors to the
claims of unsecured creditors. In the majority of situations involving an insolvent financial
institution, the institution's deposits and secured obligations exceed the value of the institu-
tion's assets. Accordingly, unsecured creditors would not receive anything on their claims.
Consequently, the FDIC or FSLIC in their receivership capacity, in structuring transactions to
transfer the assets to a new institution, will transfer only the deposit and secured claims. Typi-
cally, the FDIC and the FSLIC in their corporate capacities (the FDIC Corporate or the
FSLIC Corporate) will provide funds to the receiver to equalize the value of the assets being
purchased and the liabilities being assumed. Thus, creditors who have their claims transferred
receive 100 cents on the dollar, while creditors whose claims are not transferred are left with a
claim against an institution completely devoid of assets.
The nature of the P&A transaction was at the core of several cases decided during the
survey period. Such transactions will change in the future because FIRREA authorizes the
FDIC to prefer creditors within the same class. Pub. L. No. 10143, § 212, 103 Stat. 183, 222
(1989). The constant in the method of structuring such transactions should continue to be that
unless a claim is assumed or can be asserted against the FDIC Corporate, the claimant will be
left with a claim against an institution devoid of assets.
62. See infra note 70.
63. 718 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 81-114.
65. 718 F. Supp. at 576.
1990]
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New State never advanced additional funds, and Locke failed to repay the
loans. Consequently, New State sold the real estate serving as collateral for
such loans at a foreclosure sale. The price paid at foreclosure left a defi-
ciency balance on each of the four Locke notes. Subsequently, the FHLBB
declared New State insolvent, and FSLIC Receiver sold substantially all of
the insolvent association's assets to MeraBank Texas FSB (MeraBank).
FSLIC Corporate later acquired all four notes and filed suit against Locke.
Among other assertions, Locke claimed that the former president of State
Savings defrauded him. Specifically, Locke contended that he would have
neither purchased the raw land nor entered into the loans without the assur-
ance of continued funding from State Savings' former president. Moreover,
Locke asserted that New State reaffirmed State Savings' agreement to pro-
vide him with continued funding, but it too allegedly failed to abide by its
commitments. Locke also alleged Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)
and wrongful foreclosure claims.
The district court noted that FSLIC Corporate and FSLIC Receiver are
distinct legal entities.66 As noted above, FSLIC Corporate was the holder of
Locke's notes. Locke sought to offset his common law claims against his
obligations under those notes. The district court, however, stated that the
claims for wrongful foreclosure could not be raised against FSLIC Corpo-
rate.67 Instead, the court held that such claims only could be brought
against FSLIC Receiver because they were based on actions of the former
New State. 68 Thus, Locke could not raise defenses to FSLIC Corporate's
collection action.69 Because FSLIC Receiver was totally devoid of assets,
Locke could not recover on such claims, even if such claims were valid. 70
66. Id. at 579. FSLIC Corporate represents the interests of the insurance fund that in-
sures the deposits of savings and loan associations. Cf Weinstock, Directors and Officers of
Failing Banks: Pitfalls and Precautions, 106 BANKING L.J. 434, 445 n.4 (1989). The FSLIC
Receiver is the receiver for the failed savings and loan associations. Id. As noted earlier, § 205
of FIRREA eliminated the FSLIC. Consequently, the insurance fund for savings and loan
associations was placed under the auspices of the FDIC.
67. 718 F. Supp. at 585.
68. Id. at 580. The district court, painting with a broad brush, stated that "[n]either
FSLIC Corporate nor an acquiror like MeraBank is required to assume liabilities that are
related to the assets they agree to purchase, and neither FSLIC Corporate nor the acquiror can
be held liable for obligations they have not assumed." Id. (citing Trigo v. FDIC, 847 F.2d
1499, 1502 (11th Cir. 1988)).
69. Id. at 587.
70. In Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Say. Corp., Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1
87,811, at 95,475 (Oct. 13, 1989), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not dismiss a
claim against FSLIC Receiver based on mootness. The Triland court, however, indicated that
it would be willing to dismiss, but the record did not provide a sufficient basis for determining
whether the claims were moot. Id. at 95,477. The Triland court stated:
FSLIC [argued] ... that there will never be any assets with which to satisfy ajudgment against Sunbelt Savings nor any means to collect from any other
party, including FSLIC. If true, this contention would justify dismissal of these
actions on prudential grounds. But on the record before this court, we are un-
able to determine that there will never be any possibility of satisfying a favorablejudgment. We are unable to conclude that all potential forms of relief are per-
manently precluded.
Id. (court's emphasis). See Sunbelt Sav. FSB v. Walker Square Ltd., No. 88-1597-R (W.D.
Okla. Feb. 7, 1989) (summary judgment for FSLIC because no assets remained in receivership
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Consequently, the district court dismissed Locke's claims as moot.7 1
B. Litigation Between Creditors of a Failed Financial Institution and the
FSLIC or the FDIC
L Setoff
In FDIC v. Texarkana National Bank,72 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a creditor of an insolvent insti-
tution could validly setoff its obligations against obligations owed to it by the
former institution. This question in effect determines whether the creditor
will receive anything on its claim. If the unsecured creditor is not entitled to
a setoff, then its claim is against a receivership usually devoid of assets.
Under Locke, such claims would then be dismissed as moot.
Guaranty Bond State Bank (GBSB) failed in 1982. The FDIC as receiver
transferred most of GBSB's assets to First Bank & Trust Company of
Redwater (FBTC), in exchange for which FBTC assumed certain of GBSB's
liabilities. FDIC Receiver simultaneously transferred the remaining assets
to FDIC Corporate in exchange for cash. FDIC Receiver used such funds
to equalize the value of the assets purchased by and liabilities assumed by
FBTC.
The assets FDIC Corporate purchased from FDIC Receiver included: (i)
two certificates of deposit issued by Texarkana National Bank (TNB), in
favor of GBSB, in the aggregate amount of $200,000; (ii) GBSB's participa-
tion interest in loans originated by TNB and (fii) the portion of certain fees
paid by GBSB in connection with an automatic teller machine (ATM) shar-
ing arrangement. The FDIC brought an action to collect upon these assets.
TNB, however, contended that such funds were no longer owed because it
had setoff such obligations against the following obligations owed TNB by
GBSB: (i) two participations in nonexistent loans originated by GBSB to
Adam Bell (Bell) and Cecil Gunther (Gunther) in the aggregate amount of
$200,000; (ii) ten subordinated debentures (the GBSB Debentures) issued by
GBSB, in the aggregate amount of $100,000; (iii) several participations in
fifteen loans actually extended by GBSB in the aggregate amount of
$317,120; and (iv) additional amounts owed under the ATM agreement.
The district court had ruled in favor of TNB, thereby permitting the setoff.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the appropriateness
of the setoff in the case of each asserted obligation. The court first deter-
estate); Merabank v. Bates, No. CA-5-88-272-C (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1989) (case dismissed be-
cause the FHLBB determined receivership possessed no assets); Stevenson v. FSLIC, 716 F.
Supp. 981, 982 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (claim must be dismissed as moot after FHLBB determines
receivership estate devoid of assets, unless such determination is arbitrary and capricious, and
FHLBB later determines assets do exist). But see Veitch v. FSLIC, 729 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Tex.
1989) (Mere fact that an institution is insolvent and is in receivership is not a sufficient basis
for dismissal; the record must demonstrate that there will never be any assets with which to
satisfy a judgment).
71. 718 F. Supp. at 589.
72. 874 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1989). Curiously, the decision was written by Judge Jerre
Williams, who also dissented from the part of the opinion regarding the applicability of
D'Oench Duhme. Id. at 271.
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mined that setoff was inappropriate in the case of the participation interests
TNB purchased in the fictitious loans.73 GBSB had never made the loans to
Gunther and Bell. Accordingly, there were no loans for TNB to participate
in. Thus, TNB was left with a claim for reimbursement, in light of GBSB's
fraud, of the funds advanced for the participation interest. The court held
that TNB's reimbursement claims, however, were barred by theD'Oench
Duhme doctrine, with the result that there was no enforceable obligation
under the participations to setoff.74 Next, the court denied setoff of the
GBSB Debentures, holding that a subordinated creditor may not enhance
his position at the expense of other creditors.75 Moreover, the court held
that "as a matter of law, the subordinated debentures do not meet the test of
mutuality of obligations," which is one of the prerequisites for setoff.76
The court held FDIC Corporate liable for the additional amounts that
TNB claimed under the ATM agreement. 77 The FDIC had contended that
such claims, if valid, should be brought against FDIC Receiver and not
FDIC Corporate. The court originally stated in summary form, however,
73. Id. at 266-67.
74. Id. at 267-68. For a discussion of the D'Oench Duhme aspects of this case, see infra
text accompanying notes 94-103. The D'Oench Duhme doctrine, as it was originally formu-
lated by the United States Supreme Court, precludes a borrower from asserting a possible
defense to collection of an obligation if the borrower "lent himself to a scheme or arrangement
whereby the banking authority on which the respondent [the FDIC] relied in insuring the bank
was or was likely to be misled." 315 U.S. 447, 460 (1942).
The FDIC also argued that setoff was inappropriate because mutuality, a prerequisite for
setoff, was nonexistent. Specifically, the FDIC claimed that FDIC Corporate held the right to
collect on TNB's obligation to GBSB while TNB's claim for reimbursement was a claim
against the FDIC Receiver. In addition, the FDIC argued that "rescission based on fraud" is
not an appropriate basis for setoff. 874 F.2d at 268 n.5. The court did not need to reach these
issues because it barred TNB's claims under the D'Oench Duhme doctrine.
The dissent would have held that TNB's claim for rescission survived D'Oench Duhme. See
infra text accompanying notes 101-103. Accordingly, the dissent considered the FDIC's other
arguments. The dissent implied that mutuality did exist, stating that only the balance after
setoff is an asset of the receivership. 874 F.2d at 274. Accordingly, the FDIC Receiver could
not have transferred GBSB's entire claims against TNB to FDIC Corporate. Instead, only the
balance of such claims after deducting TNB's claim for reimbursement was conveyed to FDIC
Corporate. Id.
The dissent also would have held that setoff is proper in the case of rescission based on
fraud. Id. at 272. The dissent cited Interfirst Bank Abilene t. FDIC, 777 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir.
1985), for the proposition that rescission of a participation in light of fraud was an appropriate
basis for setoff if: (i) the claim for rescission exists prior to the bank's insolvency and does not
depend upon contractual relationships that arise thereafter, (ii) the claim is certain in amount,
and liability is absolute when suit is filed; and (iii) the claim is asserted "well before" the assets
are distributed other than a distribution pursuant to a P&A agreement. 874 F.2d at 272. The
dissent would have held that TNB met the test espoused in Interfirst Bank Abilene.
75. 874 F.2d at 269.
76. Id.
77. Id. The Texarkana Natl Bank case also determined the effect upon a participation
when the FDIC Receiver, as the lead bank, purchases collateral at a foreclosure sale. Id. at
270. The FDIC purchased the collateral at a foreclosure sale for $75,000, which was the
amount outstanding on the loan. Subsequently, the FDIC sold the property to a third party
for $70,000. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided to ignore the initial purchase
by the FDIC at the foreclosure sale. Id. According to the court, the FDIC's purchase was
merely "a paper transaction" that "represented a bookkeeping entry." Id. Thus, the partici-
pant was not entitled to share in the proceeds until the property was sold by the FDIC to a
third party.
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that FDIC Corporate is liable when FDIC Receiver does not provide for
unassumed claims. 78 The court subsequently withdrew this aspect of its
opinion. The reissued opinion stated, again in summary form, that TNB's
claims could properly be setoff.79
2. D'Oench Duhme Doctrine and 12 US.C. Section 1823(e)
The FSLIC and the FDIC use justiciability arguments in tandem with
certain other legal theories to move for dismissal without a determination on
the merits. The D'Oench Duhme doctrine and 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e) are
the two most potent arrows in the FDIC's quiver. In Beighley v. FDIC80 the
court discussed the necessary showings both to comply with 12 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1823(e)'s requirement of a writing and to overcome D'Oench Duhme's
preclusion of claims based on oral agreements.81
Beighley borrowed funds from First City National Bank of Hobbs, New
Mexico (FCNB), secured by two parcels of real estate (the Collateral). The
loan was to be repaid principally from the sale of the Collateral.8 2 Beighley
contended that FCNB agreed to finance the sale of the Collateral and thus
the repayment of Beighley's indebtedness, provided Beighley could produce
a creditworthy buyer for the Collateral. To that end, FCNB assisted in the
negotiations with, issued loan commitment letters to, and caused its attorney
to draft the documents needed for the sale of one of the two parcels serving
as the Collateral.
The day before closing on such property, however, FCNB notified the
parties that it would not fund the loan.83 Beighley filed suit against FCNB
alleging, among other things, breach of contract. FCNB subsequently failed
and FDIC Receiver was substituted as defendant in the litigation. In addi-
tion, FDIC Corporate, which had acquired the Beighley notes pursuant to
the resolution of FCNB, intervened and prosecuted its claim for payment.
The Beighley court granted FDIC Corporate's summary judgment motion
on its claim on the notes84 stating that 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e)85 barred
Beighley's defenses. The court noted that under 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e)
78. Id.
79. Id., see Mank New Braunfels, N.A. v. FDIC, 721 F. Supp. 120, 124 n.2 (N.D. Tex.
1989).
80. 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1989).
81. Id. at 782.
82. Beighley sent a letter discussing his commitment to liquidate the Collateral in order to
pay down the balance of his indebtedness.
83. Beighley contended that FCNB failed to fund in order to avoid a legal lending limit
violation.
84. 868 F.2d at 779 n.7, 783.
85. Id. at 782. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988) provides:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of the[FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this section, either as security for a
loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the (FDIC] unless such agreement (1)
shall be in writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank and the person or
persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contem-
poraneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank, (3) shall have been
approved by the board of directors of the bank or its loan committee, which
approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and (4)
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an agreement that tends to defeat or diminish the FDIC's interests is not
enforceable unless, among other things, it is in writing. 86 The court could
find no writing that evidenced the FCNB's agreement to loan funds to enable
a creditworthy party to purchase the Collateral.87 The court stated that
although the circumstances, including FCNB's issuing of loan commitment
letters to prospective purchasers, might give rise to an inference that FCNB
agreed to finance a purchaser for the Collateral, such an inference is not
sufficient to overcome the statutory writing requirement.88
The Beighley court also held that 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e) is not available
to the FDIC Receiver.89 Accordingly, if Beighley's claims were to be pre-
cluded, such preclusion had to result from the application of the D'Oench
Duhme doctrine.90 The Beighley court stated that D'Oench Duhme applies
even when the underlying transaction is not fraudulent or when the bor-
rower did not intend to deceive the regulators.91 The court stated that the
"alleged oral agreement to finance future loans [was] not clearly evidenced in
(FCNB's] records, and would not be apparent to bank examiners; [s]uch an
unwritten, unrecorded agreement is 'simply [a] secret side agreement[]
.... 92 Thus, Beighley's claims were barred by D'Oench Duhme.93
As noted previously, the Texarkana National Bank case also involved the
application of the D'Oench Duhme doctrine to certain fictitious loans. Ap-
parently, GBSB fabricated loans to Bell and Gunther and sold participa-
tions in such loans to TNB. 94 To do so, GBSB created loan documentation
that purportedly was signed by Bell and Gunther.9" The district court found
that GBSB had represented to TNB that the signatures of Bell and Gunther
were genuine and that GBSB's officers had inspected the property serving as
collateral. 96 Upon GBSB's failure, TNB had setoff its claims under the par-
ticipation. As noted previously, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that such set off was invalid because TNB's claims under the participa-
tions were barred under D'Oench Duhme.97
The Texarkana National Bank court stated that 12 U.S.C. section
1823(e), which codified D'Oench Duhme, requires an agreement that "tends
to diminish or defeat the [FDIC's] right, title or interest" in an asset to be,
among other things, in writing to be enforceable. 98 The court found that
shall have been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of
the bank.
86. 868 F.2d at 782.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 783.
89. Id. Section .217 of FIRREA provides that the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) also
apply to the FDIC Receiver. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 254.
90. 868 F.2d at 783.
91. Id. at 784.
92. Id.
93. Id.







GBSB's representations that the signatures were genuine and that the prop-
erty had been inspected were part of an agreement that tended to diminish
or defeat the FDIC's rights.99 The court indicated that "[b]y failing to, get
the representations in writing, TNB participated in an arrangement likely to
mislead the FDIC." 100 Thus, TNB's claims under the participations were
barred by both 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e) and D'Oench Duhme.
. Judge Williams, dissenting, would not have applied either the bars of
D'Oench Duhme or 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e). According to the dissent, the
fraudulent scheme was already complete before TNB became involved.1O1
Thus, TNB could not have contributed to a scheme to deceive the FDIC.
The dissent stated that it was the fictitious loans themselves, and not the
participations therein, that misled the FDIC.10 2 Presumably, the FDIC still
would have been deceived by the fictitious loans, even if neither TNB nor
anyone else had participated in such loans. The dissent then would have
proceeded to hold TNB's setoff was valid.103
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Olney Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation v. Trinity Banc Savings Association, °4 also examined 12 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1823(e) and D'Oench Duhme issues asserted for the first time on appeal.
Olney Savings & Loan Association (OSLA), now AmWest Savings Associa-
tion, obtained a judgment against Bright Banc Savings Association (formerly
Trinity Savings & Loan Association and Trinity Banc Savings Association
(Trinity)) and Bright Mortgage Company (formerly STM Mortgage Com-
pany (STM)) for fraud in connection with STM-serviced participations that
OSLA had purchased from Trinity. The transactions in question concerned
two townhouse developers who had arranged loans from Trinity for their
customers. After credit was extended, the purchasers would deed the prop-
erty back to the developers. In this manner, the developers, who otherwise
were not creditworthy, were able to obtain financing. Trinity would then sell
ninety percent participations to OSLA, and STM would service the loans.
The borrowers all defaulted on the loans, and STM bid the loan amount at
foreclosure, thereby precluding a deficiency action.
The district court determined that Trinity made certain misrepresenta-
tions to OSLA: that one-half of the purchasers would live in the town-
houses; the purchasers would make downpayments; and the townhouses
were generally in good condition. Accordingly, Trinity and STM were
found liable for fraud and the judgment included an award of punitive dam-
ages. The district court entered the judgment, and Trinity and STM filed a
supersedeas bond and otherwise perfected their appeal. Thereafter, the
FSLIC was appointed conservator.
The FSLIC contended that D'Oench Duhme can be raised at any time,
even when it was not available to the financial institution against which a
99. Id. at 268.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 271.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 274.
104. 885 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1989).
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judgment has been rendered. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that the misrepresentations made by Trinity and STM were
secret agreements, and thus, ordinarily would be barred by D'Oench
Duhme.105
The court decided, however, that D'Oench Duhme was not available to the
FSLIC in this case.10 6 The court stated that D'Oench Duhme applies only to
assets acquired by the FSLIC.10 7 Trinity and STM had already posted a
supersedeas bond when the*FSLIC entered the case;108 accordingly, such
funds no longer represented part of the receivership estate. Moreover, the
lower court's decision had rendered the participation agreements void.
Thus, the court reasoned that no rights of the FSLIC would be diminished
by the misrepresentations. 109
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also stated that one purpose of
D'Oench Duhme and 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e) is to prevent collusion be-
tween parties who deal with a financial institution and the institution's own
employees.110 The court concluded that when parties have litigated an issue
to a final judgment, the likelihood of collusion seems remote. 11
The FSLIC also contended that it was entitled under FIRREA to raise
D'Oench Duhme and 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e) for the first time on appeal.
Section 212 of FIRREA provides that the receiver or conservator on appeal
will "have all the rights and remedies available to the insured depository
institution (before the appointment of such conservator or receiver) and the
Corporation in its corporate capacity, including removal to Federal Court
and all appellate rights .... 1,,2 The court, however, stated that this provi-
sion authorizes the FSLIC to pursue all appeals even though prior to the
adoption of FIRREA only FSLIC Corporate could pursue such appeals.1 13
The provision does not entitle the FSLIC to raise D'Oench Duhme for the
first time on appeal. 114 Thus, Olney's judgment survived challenge.
3. Operations of the Receiver
Previously, we have discussed the powers and rights of the FDIC, and the
former FSLIC, when they litigate a suit that arose as a result of the actions
of the failed financial institution. The following cases concern challenges to
actions by the FDIC or the FSLIC.
105. Id. at 274-75.
106. Id. at 275.
107. Id.
108. The FSLIC also contended that punitive damages may not be assessed against an
instrumentality of the United States, such as the FSLIC. The court of appeals stated that once
the financial institution posts the supersedeas bond, the funds representing the bond are no
longer assets of the financial institution, and accordingly, do not become subject to the control
of the FSLIC. Id. at 274.
109. Id. at 275.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212, 103 Stat. 183, 222 (1989).
113. 885 F.2d at 275.
114. Id. But see FSLIC v. Stone-Liberty Land Assocs., No. 05-88-03125-CV (Tex. App.-




MBank New Braunfels, N.A. v. FDIC115 was another case that arose out
of the FDIC's resolution of the majority of MCorp's bank subsidiaries.
MBank New Braunfels, N.A. (MNB) brought suit against the FDIC claim-
ing that the FDIC had not provided a ratable distribution of funds to credi-
tors of MBank Dallas, N.A. (MBank Dallas). MNB also asked the court to
order the FDIC to rectify its continuing violation of the requirement to ef-
fect a ratable distribution of the receivership estate.1 16 The district court
treated such request as if MNB had asked the court to issue a writ of attach-
ment against the assets of the bridge bank (the Bridge Bank) 1 7 to which
MBank Dallas' assets had been transferred, in order to provide the means to
satisfy a judgment.118
MNB, one of MBank Dallas' sister-banks, sold federal funds to MBank
Dallas pursuant to an agreement under which MNB could withdraw such
funds at any time. On March 27 and 28, 1989, MNB demanded the repay-
ment of all federal funds sold. MBank Dallas never responded to such de-
mands. Instead, after business hours on March 28, 1989, the Comptroller
declared MBank Dallas insolvent and ippointed the FDIC as receiver.
FDIC Receiver entered into a P&A agreement with the Bridge Bank, pursu-
ant to which the Bridge Bank assumed all of MBank Dallas' liabilities for
federal funds purchased, except for the federal funds purchased from sister-
banks.
The district court stated that the standard for granting a writ of attach-
ment is the same as that for granting a preliminary injunction.119 Accord-
ingly, MNB needed to demonstrate:
(1) a substantial likelihood [of success]... on the merits;
(2) a substantial threat that irreparable injury will result if the [writ] is
not granted;
(3) the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs any damage to defend-
ant from issuance of [the writ] and
(4) granting the [writ] will not disserve the public interest. 120
The district court addressed each of these factors.
The district court stated that the National Bank Act of 1864, as amended
(the National Bank Act), required a receiver to make a ratable distribu-
tion1 21 of the assets of the receivership.122 The FDIC contended that MNB
received its pro rata share of the receivership estate because the FDIC had
been prepared to pay MNB the same amount as MNB would have received
if MBank Dallas had been liquidated. The district court held that it was not
115. 721 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
116. See infra text accompanying notes 119-120.
117. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(i) (1988) provides the FDIC with the authority to establish a bridge
bank in order to facilitate the resolution of a failed bank.
118. 721 F. Supp. at 121.
119. Id. at 122.
120. Id.
121. 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1988) (made applicable to the FDIC by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1988)).
122. 721 F. Supp. at 123.
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a ratable distribution to provide MNB with its pro rata share while others
who sold federal funds to MBank Dallas had their claims honored 100 per-
cent, as a result of such claims being assumed by the Bridge Bank.12 3
The FDIC also argued that, under the National Bank Act, a court cannot
issue the writ against a national bank.124 The district court, however, stated
that the bar on issuing the writ was limited to preventing creditors from
taking action against bank property before a final judgment is rendered. 12
The district court, however, stated that property that was held but not
owned by a national bank could still be attached.12 6 Moreover, a court
could enjoin action to protect the creditors of property held by a national
bank until resolution of the controversy.127 Nonetheless, the district court
decided that the requested writ did not request property held by a bank, but
instead was an impermissible request for attachment of the FDIC's prop-
erty. 128 The district court further determined that MNB did not demon-
strate that it would be irreparably harmed by the failure to issue the writ. 129
Thus, although the district court determined that MNB probably would pre-
vail on the merits, the court refused to issue the writ because MNB did not
satisfy the other prerequisites for it.130
The MBank New Braunfels decision calls into question the regulators'
"strategy ' 131 in declaring insolvent allegedly healthy bank subsidiaries
owned by First RepublicBank Corp. and Texas American Bankshares, Inc.
Two provisions of FIRREA, however, will probably enable the FDIC to
prevent similar challenges in the future. First, section 206 of FIRREA
makes federally-insured institutions liable to the FDIC if one of their sister-
institutions fails. 132 Thus, FIRREA effectively adopts elements of the Fed-
eral Reserve's Source of Strength Policy Statement.1 33 Second, section 212
of FIRREA eliminates the requirement that the FDIC provide creditors
with a ratable distribution. Instead, FIRREA authorizes the FDIC to prefer
creditors in different classes.1 34 An open question is whether such authority
123. Id. at 124. The district court also held that MNB would be entitled to interest from
the date the other creditors received a distribution, namely when the Bridge Bank assumed
such indebtedness. Id. at 125.
124. The FDIC based its argument on 12 U.S.C. § 91 (1988), which provides: "[N]o at-
tachment, injunction, or execution, shall be issued against [a national bank] or its property
before final judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding, in any State, county, or municipal
court."
125. 721 F. Supp. at 125.
126. Id. at 126.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a) (1988)).
129. 721 F. Supp. at 127.
130. Id.
131. Judge Says FDIC Broke the Law in Forcing Texas Bank Failures, Am. Bankr., Sept. 7,
1989, at 1, col. 3.
132. See Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 206, 103 Stat. 183, 195. The FDIC has already employed
the authority contained in § 206 of FIRREA. According to John Douglas, former FDIC gen-
eral counsel, the FDIC sent out its "first 'bill' under the... cross-guarantees provision" on
September 1, 1989. FDIC Issues First Cross-Guarantees Bill, General Counsel Douglas Says,
[July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at 375-76 (Sept. 18, 1989).
133. See supra text accompanying note 6.
134. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212, 103 Stat. 183, 222.
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will be given retroactive effect.
b. Purchase and Assumption Transaction as a Fraudulent Conveyance
Valley Ranch Development Co. v. Sunbelt Savings, FSB135 concerned
whether the FSLIC's disposition of the assets of a failed savings and loan
association violated the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(TUFTA).1 36 The FSLIC had transferred all of the assets but not all of the
liabilities of several savings and loan associations, including Sunbelt Savings
Association (Old Sunbelt), to a newly chartered savings and loan association
(New Sunbelt). The only liabilities transferred to New Sunbelt were the
claims of depositors and secured creditors. The plaintiffs, who were un-
secured creditors of Old Sunbelt, claimed that the transaction was a fraudu-
lent conveyance.
The district court held that the broad authority provided to FSLIC to
settle the affairs of insolvent savings and loan associations preempted appli-
cation of the TUFTA to such institutions. 137 The district court stated that it
is not fraudulent for the FSLIC to distribute assets in accordance with fed-
eral banking laws. 138
The then applicable banking regulations required the FSLIC to honor pri-
orities established under state law for disposition of assets of a failed savings
and loan association. 139 The Texas "depositor preference" statute' 4° details
the order in which the claims of the different classes of an insolvent financial
institution's creditors must be honored. The amount of Old Sunbelt's de-
posit and secured liabilities exceeded the amount of its assets. Thus, the
unsecured creditors of Old Sunbelt would have received nothing if Old Sun-
belt had been liquidated. The court held that such creditors could not im-
prove their position because the FSLIC opted for another method to dispose
of Old Sunbelt's affairs. 141
135. 714 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
136. T x. Bus. & COMM. CODE. ANN. § 24 (Vernon 1987).
137. 714 F. Supp. at 818. The district court dismissed another claim in an almost identical
opinion. See Gulley v. Sunbelt Say., FSB, 714 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
138. 714 F. Supp. at 818-19.
139. Id.
140. Tax. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 342, 803a (Vernon Supp. 1990).
141. 714 F. Supp. at 818-19. The result in Valley Ranch Dev. Co. might make it less diffi-
cult to engage in open-bank assistance transactions under § 13(c) of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988). In 1987, the Texas Legislature added a provision that
made the deposit preference statute applicable to open-bank transactions. Tax. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 342, § 803a (Vernon Supp. 1990). Practitioners, however, have hesitated to
structure open-bank transactions, because they feared that under the TUFTA the claims of
unsecured creditors, including contingent claims, would follow the insolvent institution's as-
sets to the solvent purchaser of such assets. Presumably, the holding in Valley Ranch Dev. Co.
should also apply to open-bank transactions because the financial institution must be insolvent
before the FDIC will render financial assistance. See FDIC Policy Statement on Open-Bank
Assistance, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,122 (1988). Thus, Valley Ranch Dev. Co. should preclude claim-
ants from relying on the TUFTA in an action against purchasers of an insolvent financial
institution in an open-bank assistance transaction.
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c. Transfer of Trust Accounts
Two cases during the survey period addressed whether the FDIC, in its
receivership capacity, possesses the authority to transfer the trust depart-
ment of a failed bank without the need to comply with the requirements of
state trust law. In first National Bank of Andrews v. FDIC,142 the district
court held that the provisions of the Texas Banking Code of 1943,143 as
amended (the Banking Code), governing liquidation of failed state banks,
preempted the provisions of the Texas Trust Code of 1983, as amended (the
Texas Trust Code), 144 concerning designation of replacement trustees.
The First National Bank of Andrews (FNB-Andrews) had entered into a
P & A agreement, pursuant to which it purchased the assets and assumed
the liabilities, of Permian Bank, a failed state bank, from FDIC Receiver.
The P&A agreement purported to vest in FNB-Andrews all rights of the
Permian Bank as fiduciary. Subsequently, FNB-Andrews sought a declara-
tory judgment to invalidate the P&A agreement because it allegedly violated
the provisions of the Texas Trust Code. Specifically, the Texas Trust Code
requires court appointment of a successor trustee when such successor is not
designated in the trust instrument. 145
The district court held that the Texas Banking Code's exclusive structure
for disposition of the affairs of an insolvent state bank mandated the court's
decision that the Banking Code provisions supersede the requirements of the
Texas Trust Code. 1 " The district court stated that its holding only re-
quired a "limited intrusion of the banking liquidation procedures into mat-
ters of trust law." 147
The First National Bank of Andrews court also held that FNB-Andrews
had not assumed the liabilities of Permian Bank for breach of fiduciary
duty.14 8 The district court stated that this aspect of its decision, among
other things, was supported by the lack of provisions in the P&A agreement
addressing such issue,' 49 the Texas Trust Code's provision that a successor
trustee is liable only for breaches of duty of which it knows or should know
and the lack of a provision in the Banking Code covering such issue. 1
In NCNB Texas National Bank v. Cowden 15 1 the district court extended
the First National Bank of Andrews decision to a situation in which the
FDIC is appointed receiver for a failed national bank. Obviously, in such a
case, the provisions of the Texas Banking Code are not applicable. The Cow-
den court noted, however, that the Federal Deposit Insurance Act'5 2 pro-
142. 707 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
143. TEx. BANKING CODE art. 342-801 to 342-816 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
144. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.083(a) (Vernon 1983).
145. Id.
146. 707 F. Supp. at 269.
147. Id. at 268 (court's emphasis).
148. Id. at 271.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 712 F. Supp. 1249 (W.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, 895 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir. 1990).
152. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1988).
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vides a comprehensive scheme governing when the FDIC .is appointed as
receiver for a failed bank.15 3 The district court concluded that Congress had
intended by such provisions to preempt state law (the Texas Trust Code).15 4
Section 217 of FIRREA enables the FDIC to transfer the trust business of
a failed bank, including its fiduciary appointments, to another institution.155
Thus, FIRREA, by codifying the Cowden and First National Bank of An-
drews decisions, should eliminate challenges to the FDIC's ability to transfer
the trust business together with the remainder of the failed institution.
4. Control
The case of Gaubert v. United States156 considered the extent of authority
the FHLBB must exercise over a savings and loan association before the
FHLBB will be deemed liable for the association's activities. Thomas
Gaubert (Gaubert) was the largest shareholder and chairman of the board of
Independent American Savings Association (IASA). The FHLBB desired
that IASA merge with Investex Savings (Investex), a failing savings and
loan association. Gaubert's anticipated involvement in the resulting associa-
tion, however, concerned the FHLBB. Accordingly, the FHLBB and the
Federal Home Loan Bank of Dallas (the FHLB-Dallas) asked Gaubert to
agree to a "neutralization" agreement, pursuant to which Gaubert would
not participate in the resulting association's affairs. Gaubert was also re-
quested to guarantee that the resulting association's capital ratios were con-
sistent with regulatory requirements. Gaubert pledged real estate with a
value of $25 million in order to secure such "guarantee."
The regulators then assisted IASA in drafting its proxy statement to ob-
tain shareholder approval for the merger. In addition, the regulators pro-
vided both financial and regulatory advice to IASA. All this regulatory
action occurred even though IASA was not subject to any regulatory agree-
ment, administrative action, or conservatorship. The FHLBB simply ad-
vised IASA to engage in such actions.
In addition, the FHLB-Dallas informed IASA that IASA must elect or
appoint certain individuals chosen by the FHLB-Dallas to serve as IASA's
officers and directors. Otherwise, IASA would be closed. The FHLB-Dallas
released Gaubert from the neutralization agreement in exchange for
Gaubert's agreeing to persuade the IASA board to resign. A former FHLB-
Dallas employee was selected as IASA's new chief executive officer. FHLB-
Dallas played an increasingly active role in IASA's affairs. Specifically,
FHLB-Dallas selected a consulting company for IASA, advised IASA re-
garding the manner in which to cause certain of its subsidiaries to file for
bankruptcy, mediated salary disputes for IASA employees, and urged IASA
to convert to a federal charter in order to provide the FHLB-Dallas with
exclusive supervisory authority over IASA.
153. 712 F. Supp. at 1253-56.
154. Id.
155. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 254.
156. 885 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1989).
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The new IASA board announced that IASA's net worth was negative
$500 million. This was in contrast to IASA's reported net worth of approxi-
mately $75 million just a few months before. Ultimately, IASA became
insolvent, with the result that Gaubert lost his entire stock investment and
the real estate he had pledged pursuant to the neutralization agreement.
Gaubert filed suit asserting that FHLB-Dallas had negligently selected
IASA's board of directors and had negligently engaged in IASA's daily
affairs.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that instrumentalities of
the Federal Government, such as FHLBB and FHLB-Dallas, are generally
protected from liability by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 15 7 Congress
previously adopted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),158 in order to
waive such immunity when a government agency has acted negligently.159
The FTCA, however, still bars a cause of action when the governmental
authority exercises or fails to exercise a "discretionary function.., whether
or not the discretion involved [is] abused." 16° The district court held that
Gaubert's suit failed to survive this discretionary function exception. 161
The Gaubert court stated that only policy decisions, in contrast to opera-
tional actions, are protected by the discretionary function exception. 162 The
court determined that the decisions to merge IASA, enter into a neutraliza-
tion agreement, and replace the IASA board of directors were all policy de-
cisions; and thus, were protected from suit.163 In contrast, the Gaubert
court concluded that the FHLB-Dallas' advice regarding retaining a consult-
ant and converting to a Federal charter were operational decisions.164 The
court of appeals then decided that Gaubert may have standing to bring such
an action because he suffered a personal injury not shared by IASA's share-
holders.1 65 The court stated that Gaubert possessed standing to pursue his
loss of the real estate he pledged pursuant to the neutralization agree-
ment. 1 66 The court then remanded the action for a determination regarding
whether Gaubert would have a valid claim for the value of such real es-
tate. 1 67 The court stated, however, that Gaubert did not possess standing to
bring a claim for the diminution of his stock ownership.1 68
157. Id. at 1286.
158. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)).
159. 885 F.2d at 1287.
160. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1289.
163. Id. at 1290. Cf FSLIC v. Locke, 718 F. Supp. 573, 583 (W.D.Tex. 1989) (the
FSLIC's actions as conservator of savings and loan association did not constitute dominion
and control; thus, the FSLIC was not barred from raising D'Oench Duhme).
164. 885 F.2d at 1290.
165. Id. at 1291.
166. Id. at 1292.
167. Id.
168. Id. Generally, shareholders of financial institutions do not possess standing to sue for
their lost investment. Such causes of action belong to the institution, itself, or if the institution
has failed, to the receiver for the institution. See Weinstock, supra note 66, at 444-45.
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C Corporate Law Issues
L Inheriting Criminal Liability
In United States v. Central National,'6 9 a Case of first impression in the
Fifth Circuit and likely the entire country, Alamo Bank of Texas (Alamo
Bank) was held liable for criminal violations committed by its merger part-
ner--Central National Bank (CNB). CNB was accused of violating the
Bank Secrecy Act by failing to file currency transaction reports (CTRs) 170
between February 1983 and April 1984. In 1987, CNB merged with and
into Alamo Bank under Alamo Bank's charter with a branch at the former
CNB banking facilities. Prior to the merger, Alamo Bank received some
assurance that the Comptroller17l would not pursue a criminal referral to
the Treasury for civil money penalties as a consequence of the failure to file
the CTRs. Nonetheless, the Justice Department brought an action on its
own asserting that Alamo Bank, as the successor-in-interest to CNB, as-
sumed all claims against CNB including criminal liabilities. The district
court noted that both the federal and state statutes that authorize bank
mergers provide that the resulting institution is responsible for the obliga-
tions of all of the merging banks.172 The district court held that such stat-
utes were broad enough to encompass liabilities resulting from criminal
activities. 173
Before a party may be convicted under the Bank Secrecy Act, the United
States government must prove that a financial institution knowingly failed to
file CTRs.174 Alamo Bank argued before the Fifth Circuit that only CNB,
and not Alamo Bank, possessed sufficient intent. Accordingly, Alamo Bank
contended that to impose liability upon Alamo Bank for CNB's crimes vio-
lated its constitutional right to due process.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the real issue in
the case was whether CNB actually ceased to exist when it merged with
Alamo Bank. "The United States contends that it did not prosecute Alamo
[Bank] for the actions of another; rather, the United States is seeking to hold
CNB responsible for its crimes, and CNB still exists under the name
Alamo.... If this is correct Alamo's contentions are moot."' 7 5 The court
of appeals held that the federal statute that authorizes bank mergers pro-
169. 705 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 880 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1989).
170. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5322(b) (1988). CNB was also allegedly engaged in a conspiracy
to avoid filing CTR in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
171. LaBoon & Paulsen, Thinking About a Merger? Remember the Alamo Case, 2 BANK-
ING L. REV. 5 (1989). According to the authors, the Comptroller "acknowledged violations in
a letter," but concluded that " '[b]ased on the information [now] available, a recommendation
to Treasury for assessment of civil penalties will not be pursued, provided the Bank, in good
faith, makes prompt efforts to correct the violations."' Id. at 5-6. Only the Justice Depart-
ment, however, and not the federal banking agencies, may prosecute criminal cases. Villa,
Banking Crimes - Fraud, Money Laundering and Embezzlement 1, 1-6 (1987).
172. 705 F. Supp. at 337.
173. Id.
174. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5322(b) (1988).
175. 880 F.2d 828, 829 (5th Cir. 1989).
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vides that "the resulting State bank shall be considered the same business
and corporate entity as the national banking association.. .. -176 Accord-
ingly, Alamo Bank was found to be a continuation of CNB, and thus, liable
for the violations committed by CNB. l'"
The result of the Central National Bank holding is that institutions pursu-
ing a bank merger must consider possible criminal violations when they per-
form their due diligence. Institutions should be hesitant of relying solely on
assurances, as Alamo Bank did, that criminal actions will not be pursued.
Accordingly, whenever possible, such institutions should contract for in-
demnification from sellers. In addition, acquirors might consider using a
holding company as a vehicle for acquiring a bank, and delay merging the
banks, at least until the limitations period has run.
2. Employment Agreements
The National Bank Act' 78 enables the board of directors of a national
bank to dismiss the officers of such bank "at pleasure." 17 9  Although na-
tional banks may enter into employment agreements with their officers,180
such agreements have been held to be voidable at the bank's option without
compensation. 181 Prospective officers of national banks, who desire to limit
the board's authority to dismiss them without compensation, have often
sought to brunt the impact of this provision by (i) requiring the bank's direc-
tors to guarantee the employment agreement, (ii) entering into a personal
services agreement directly with the bank's directors or (iii) entering into an
employment agreement with the bank's holding company.
Article 342-409 of the Banking Code also contains a provision entitling
the board of a state bank, in its discretion, to dismiss the bank's officers.18 2
This article, however, provides that "any contract for a fixed term of em-
ployment shall be void."' 18 3 Thus, the Banking Code provisions concerning
agreements with bank officers limits a state bank's ability to elect the alterna-
tives discussed above. This distinction was demonstrated by the decision in
Smith v. Joplin.184
The Smith case concerned an employment agreement between Texas Bank
176. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 214b (1988)).
177. 880 F.2d at 829.
178. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
179. Id.
180. 12 C.F.R. § 7.5220 (1988).
181. See, ag., Kemper v. First Nat'l Bank in Newton, 94 111. App. 3d 169, 418 N.E.2d 819
(1981) (National Bank Act empowered board of directors to dismiss bank president before
conclusion of his tenure without subjecting bank to liability for wrongful discharge). Cf Citi-
zens State Bank v. Libertelli, 215 N.J. Super. 190, 521 A.2d 867 (App. Div. 1987) (five-year
employment agreement between New Jersey-chartered bank and its president was unenforce-
able, because state banking laws entitled board to remove bank's officers at pleasure). But see
Potter v. Village Bank of N.J., 225 N.J. Super. 547, 543 A.2d 80 (App. Div. 1988) (public
policy prevented directors from discharging bank president who reported alleged money laun-
dering activities of bank's directors).
182. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-409 (Vernon 1981).
183. Id.
184. 879 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1989).
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& Trust Co. (TB&T), a state-chartered bank, and Charles Joplin. In the fall
of 1986, TB&T was failing, and the Commissioner had placed TB&T under
supervision. The directors of TB&T asked Joplin to serve as president.
Before Joplin would accept the job, he required that six months' compensa-
tion be paid either in advance or into an escrow account. Instead, the direc-
tors guaranteed Joplin's six-month employment agreement. The escrow
account was never created, and TB&T failed two months later.
Subsequently, the directors sought a declaratory judgment that Joplin's
employment agreement was unenforceable. Joplin counterclaimed for com-
pensation covering the remaining four months of his employment contract.
Joplin claimed that his employment agreement was with the directors di-
rectly. Alternatively, he claimed that it was permissible for the directors to
guarantee his employment agreement.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the directors were not
responsible for the balance-of Joplin's employment agreement.18 5 First, the
court held that the employment agreement was between Joplin and
TB&T.18 6 The Joplin court noted that directors, acting in their individual
capacities, cannot hire a bank president. Second, the court held that guaran-
tors are not liable when the underlying obligation is unenforceable.187 Thus,
the Joplin decision eliminates one technique, and casts doubts on other al-




One of the cases that arose during the survey period extended the applica-
bility of the antitying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act.188 In
Amerifirst Properties, Ina v. FDIC,18 9 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that a bank could not "tie" a loan commitment to a borrower's
agreeing to purchase real estate.190
Ameriflrst Properties, Inc. (Amerifirst) negotiated with Western Bank-
Westheimer (Western Bank)191 for a loan. Western Bank committed to fund
the loan on the condition that Amerifirst purchase a parcel of real estate
then being held as other real estate owned ("OREO"). by Western Bank.1 92
185. Id. at 160.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(A) (1982). This section states that "[a] bank shall not in any
manner extend credit... on the condition or requirement-(A) that the customer shall obtain
some additional credit, property, or service from such bank other than a loan, discount, de-
posit, or trust service."
189. 880 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1989).
190. Id. at 823-24.
191. The FDIC, as the receiver for Western Bank, substituted itself as the real party in
interest.
192. This practice was not uncommon during the past few years as financial institutions
struggled to survive. See JST Properties v. First Nat'l Bank, 701 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Minn.
1988) (borrowers who were required to accept other real estate owned as part of real estate
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Subsequently, Western Bank reneged on its loan commitment because it had
entered into an agreement to sell the real estate to a third party.
The district court dismissed Amerifirst's antitying complaint because
Western Bank never funded the loan. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, however, held that actual funding of a loan is not required. 193 The
court of appeals noted that Western Bank's use of economic leverage was
precisely what the antitying provisions were intended to prevent. 194 Thus,
the mere "offer of a tied loan," not the consummation of the loan, is suffi-
cient for a violation to occur.195
2. Promissory Estoppel and Breach of Contract
In MBank Abilene, N.A. v. LeMaire,196 MBank Abilene N.A. (MBank
Abilene) appealed a $69 million judgment that it had breached an oral com-
mitment to lend. In 1976, Abilene National Bank (ANB), MBank Abilene's
predecessor, began funding the oil and gas exploration efforts of Richard
Patton (Patton) and Harry LeMaire (LeMaire). When Patton and LeMaire
had an opportunity to acquire certain oil and gas properties, ANB's Presi-
dent, Don Earney (Earney), encouraged Patton and LeMaire to form a hold-
ing company for such purpose. Earney joined the Board of Directors of the
new venture. Afterwards, ANB loaned $3 million and Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust (Continental) loaned $5 million to LeMaire and
Patton's holding company. Subsequently, LeMaire and Patton, at Earney's
request, moved their entire banking relationship from Continental to ANB.
In 1982, Earney made the oral commitment to extend credit, of up to $3
million, that became the subject of litigation. The loan commitment was
made in violation of ANB's legal lending limit. Consequently, the Comp-
troller issued a cease and desist order prohibiting ANB from funding the
commitment. When LeMaire and Patton were unable to obtain financing
elsewhere, their company failed. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Le-
Maire and Patton for $100 million, which was reduced to $18.5 million after
this appeal.
On appeal, MBank Abilene raised over 150 points of error, asserting, most
importantly, that the terms of the contract were not definite. The court of
appeals determined that the jury could have inferred the terms of the oral
contract from the parties' extensive course of dealings. 197 MBank Abilene
contended, however, that the Statute of Frauds' 98 required the oral commit-
ment to lend, even if a valid contract, to be in writing to be enforceable. The
loan package sued bank alleging impermissible tie). Typically, such transactions were an at-
tempt to convert a non-income-producing property into an earning asset. Moreover, the sale
of other real estate owned at a price in excess of book value would increase the institution's
capital.
193. 880 F.2d at 824.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 825 (court's emphasis).
196. No. C14-86-00834-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], Apr. 6, 1989, n.w.h.) (not
yet reported).
197. Id., slip. op. at 7 (Westlaw, CS-TX).
198. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1988).
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court of appeals agreed, because the loan commitment, when eventually
funded, would have been secured by oil and gas properties.1 99 If the con-
tract were unenforceable, then ANB could not have breached it.2°° None-
theless, the court upheld the jury verdict under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.201
MiBank Abilene also raised other contentions, the most notable of which
was that the oral commitment was unenforceable because it violated ANB's
then existing legal lending limit. The court of appeals stated that there was
an apparent conflict of authority on this issue.202 The court held that the
plaintiffs could obtain damages because the legal lending limit provisions
did not preempt actions based on state common law principles.20 3 The court
of appeals dismissed MBank Abilene's other points of error and afrmed the
award of damages to LeMaire and Patton.204
Primarily as a result of the LeMaire decision, the FDIC, as receiver for
MBank Abilene, paid off all insured deposits.205 Such an approach differs
dramatically from the manner in which the FDIC Receiver resolved the
other MBanks for which it was appointed receiver.2°6 In contrast, the
Bridge Bank engaged in P&A transactions with the other failed MBanks.
II. STATUTORY LAW
The 1989 legislative session passed a flurry of bills that affect financial




The Texas Legislature adopted a statute intended to provide state banks
with protection, equal to that afforded national banks, from actions to col-
lect on a judgment before it becomes final. The National Bank Act includes
a provision 2 7 interpreted to bar enforcement actions against a national bank
until all appeals have been exhausted.208 This provision also enables na-
tional banks to appeal adverse judgments without first posting a supersedeas
bond.20 9
This is not the first time that government officials have attempted to pro-
199. No. C14-86-00834-CV, slip op. at 9 (Westlaw, CS-TX).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id., slip op. at 7 (Westaw, CS-TX).
203. Id., slip op. at 8 (Westaw, CS-TX).
204. Id., slip. op. at 29-30 (Westlaw, CS-TX).
205. Lender Liability Case Explores New Ground, 5 Texas Lawyer, April 17, 1989, at 18,
col. 2.
206. Id.
207. 12 U.S.C. § 91 (1988).
208. See, e.g., U.S. v. Taylor, 881 F.2d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 1989) (12 U.S.C. § 91 (1988)
(bars abstracts of judgment against a national bank's assets until all appeals have been
exhausted).
209. 12 U.S.C. § 91 (1988).
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vide such protections to state financial institutions. In 1988, the Texas De-
partment of Banking (the Banking Department) adopted a regulation that
provided that:
[n]o attachment, injunction, or execution against any State Bank or its
property shall be effective if issued before final judgment in any suit,
action or proceeding in any court. As used in this section, the term
'final judgment' means a judgment on the merits which is no longer
subject to examination on appeal and either because of disposition on
appeal and conclusion of the appellate process, or because of the pas-
sage, without action, of the time for seeking appellate review.210
The court of appeals in Bank of East Texas v. Jones,211 however, held that
the Banking Department lacked the statutory authority to promulgate such
a regulation. Accordingly, the Legislature effectively overruled this holding
last session when it enacted a statute that closely paralleled the contents of
the Banking Department's regulation.2 12 Moreover, the Legislature ex-
panded the statute's scope to include savings and loan associations.213 The
statute does not restrict writs of garnishment served on accounts maintained
at a financial institution on behalf of the institution's customers. 214 In addi-
tion, the statute only affects orders entered after September 1, 1989.215
A notable omission in the statute is that it does not explicitly cover a
financial institution's directors, officers and agents when they act within the
scope of their employment. Presumably, the protections afforded by the
statute were intended to be extended to people acting in their official capac-
ity because a financial institution can act only through its directors, officers
and agents. Nonetheless, the statute is silent on this issue.
2. Customer Records
One statute enacted during the last legislative session is intended to reduce
the burdens on financial institutions resulting from the production of bank
records. 216 Previously, financial institutions were subject to the conflicting
desires of litigants requesting customer records and bank customers attempt-
ing to keep their affairs private. Consequently, financial institutions that
sought to protect their customers' privacy, by contesting the validity and
breadth of a subpoena, often became entangled in other people's litigation.
Conversely, financial institutions that agreed to provide the requested infor-
210. 7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.27 (Jan. 12, 1988).
211. 758 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
212. 7 TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-609 (Vernon 1989).
213. Id These protections were not conferred upon credit unions.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-705 (Vernon 1989).
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) promulgated a regulation that would have governed
disclosure of customer information by Federal Savings and Loan Associations (Federal S&Ls).
54 Fed. Reg. 5629 (1989). This regulation, which became effective December 15, 1989, would
have preempted state law provisions from covering Federal S&Ls. The OT'S, however, has
indicated its intent to withdraw this regulation. See OTS Plans to Withdraw Rule that Limits




mation became subject to causes of action based on common law rights of
privacy.
Parties in disputes with financial institutions were also using demands for
customer records as a weapon. The previous statute did not require the
party requesting the records to cover all the costs entailed in record produc-
tion.217 Consequently, there was a tremendous shortfall between the time
and expense associated with production of records and the amount that
could be recouped from the party requesting such document production.
Moreover, financial institutions were hesitant to expose their customers' af-
fairs to adverse parties in litigation. Thus, financial institutions often settled
lawsuits when they otherwise would not have been inclined to do so.
The Legislature responded to this problem by adopting procedures to ob-
tain bank records.218 These procedures differ depending upon whether the
financial institution or the customer is a proper or necessary party to the
proceeding. 219
a. Privacy
A financial institution need not disclose records of an individual who is
not a party to a lawsuit unless both (i) a court orders production, and (ii) the
financial institution obtains the customer's written consent.220 Unless a
court orders otherwise, a party seeking the records of a customer, who is
also a proper or necessary party to the litigation, must provide the customer
with notice of the order, subpoena or request, in the manner provided by
Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.221 Such notice must be
given at least ten days prior to the date upon which the financial institution
must comply with the order, subpoena or request; 222 and the party must
certify to the financial institution, at the time the order, subpoena or request
is provided, that the customer has been served with or mailed a copy of the
order, subpoena or request.223 Even with customer consent, the litigant
must pay the costs of document production.224
In response to a notice of an order, subpoena, or request for disclosure,
examination or production of customer records; customers can file a motion
to quash or for protection from such production requests.2 25 A motion to
quash or for protection must be verified.226 In addition, the motion to quash
or for protection must be filed before the date set for disclosure and must be
served on both the party requesting such records and the financial institu-
tion.22 7 Failure to file a motion to quash is deemed to be consent to the
217. The former article 342-705 only covered the reasonable costs of copying records.













The statute does not restrict the ability of a bank to use or disclose cus-
tomer records, if such disclosure is: (i) in good faith and in the usual course
of the institution's financial business, (ii) in the usual course of litigation
affecting the institution's interests, or (iii) with the express or implied con-
sent of the customer.229
Curiously, this provision of the statute refers to a bank rather than a finan-
cial institution. Accordingly, courts probably will be called upon to deter-
mine whether use of customer records by financial institutions other than
banks was implicitly limited by the statute. Further, the statute does not
restrict disclosures that might be required under federal law. The statute
also does not apply to the investigation or prosecution of criminal offenses,
requests for records by investigative committees of the Texas Legislature, or
requests for records by the Texas Attorney General.
b. Costs
A litigant requesting the records of a customer must either pay the esti-
mated costs of production in full in advance or post a cost bond in an
amount sufficient to cover such expenses. 230 Such expenses include costs of
reproduction, postage, delivery and other expenses associated with request-
ing disclosure, obtaining consents for disclosure, or examining or producing
records.23t Accordingly, such costs now include lost employee time.
3. Statute of Frauds
The Legislature's amendments to the Statute of Frauds 232 were perhaps
the highlight of its efforts to reduce the vulnerability of financial institutions
to lender liability suits. Increasingly, banks have been required to defend
suits for breach of oral commitments to lend funds. The LeMaire case,2 3 3
discussed earlier, originally resulted in a jury verdict against MBank Abi-
lene, in the amount of $100 million,234 because ANB's breach of an oral
commitment to lend allegedly led to the demise of the plaintiffs' oil and gas
company.
The amendments to the Statute of Frauds require a loan agreement, 235
involving an amount in excess of $50,000 to be both in writing and signed by





232. Tex. S.B. 413, 71st Leg. (1989). The legislative history of the amendments noted the
need to reduce the number of lender liability suits by providing certainty regarding when an
agreement to lend must be in writing to be enforceable.
233. No. C14-86-00834-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist], Apr. 6, 1989) (not yet
reported).
234. The judgment was reduced to $18 million on appeal.
235. The definition of the term "loan agreement" excludes credit card and open-ended
consumer accounts. Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. § 26.02 (Vernon 1989).
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enforceable.236 The amendments provide that prior and contemporaneous
oral agreements may not be used to vary the terms of a written agreement
that complies with the Statute of Frauds.237 In order to take advantage of
the protections afforded by the amendments, a financial institution must
both (i) cause the customer to execute a statement that details the require-
ments of the statute (this statement may be part of other transaction docu-
ments, such as the loan agreement) and (ii) conspicuously post notice in the
lobby disclosing the applicability of the Statute of Frauds to oral
agreements.238
The content of the statutory notice has created some confusion because it
apparently contains a typographical error. According to the Statute of
Frauds amendments, the notice is required to state that a written agreement
"may not be contradicted by evidence of prior, contemporaneous or subse-
quent oral agreements of the parties.' '239 The operative provisions of the
statute, however, are silent regarding the effect of subsequent oral agree-
ments. According to State Senator Ike Harris, in a letter sent to the Com-
missioner for the Banking Department (the Commissioner), the discrepancy
resulted because the bill was amended to delete the word "subsequent" in
both the text of the statute and the notice provision but, mistakenly, the term
was not deleted in the notice.24° According to the Senator, the Legislature
will attempt to correct the error during the 1991 Legislative Session.241 In
the meantime, however, financial institutions must continue to use the statu-
tory notice.
Two other aspects of the amendments are worth noting. First, the amend-
ments to the Statute of Frauds take effect on September 1, 1989, but do not
apply to loan agreements executed before but renewed or extended after that
date.242 Second, the original Senate version of the bill 243 explicitly noted
that the amendments to the Statute of Frauds did not apply to causes of
action brought under the DTPA.24 The final version, however, makes no
reference to DTPA actions.245 Consequently, the legislative history appears
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. The notice must be prominently displayed in a manner that will "fully inform
borrowers" of the statutes requirements. Id. The Statute of Frauds states that if the customer
does not execute a statement regarding the statute's contents, then the statute's provisions do
not apply. Id. The statute also requires a posted notice, but does not state that failure to post
a notice will make the protections inapplicable. Id. Consequently, a penalty for failing to post
the required notice may not be imposed.
The Finance Commission of Texas requires a notice, "which must be signed by both the
borrower and the financial institution," to be enforceable against both parties. TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.34. It "can be in a separate document or incorporated in one or more of the docu-
ments constituting the loan agreement." Id. "The notice must be in type that is bold faced,
capitalized, underlined or otherwise set out from surrounding written material so as to be
conspicuous." Id.
239. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.02 (Vernon 1989).
240. Letter from O.H. "Ike" Harris to Commissioner Kenneth Littlefield (Aug. 9, 1989).
241. Id.
242. Tex. S.B. 413, 71st Leg. (1989).
243. Id.
244. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon 1983).
245. Id. § 26.02.
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to support a Statute of Frauds defense to a DTPA action.
The Legislature's extensive efforts to amend the Statute of Frauds might
well have been wasted. The amendments were intended to avoid judgments,
such as the LeMaire decision, against financial institutions for breach of oral
agreements. What if the amendments were in effect before the litigation in
LeMaire? The LeMaire court held that the loan commitment at issue in-
volved realty, and therefore, must have been in writing to be enforceable. 246
Nonetheless, MBank Abilene was held liable because LeMaire had relied on
ANB's oral representations. 247 Thus, although the contract was required to
be in writing, the court enforced the agreement on a promissory estoppel
theory.248
The rationale for the LeMaire holding casts doubt upon the protections
provided by the amendments to the Statute of Frauds. It is unusual for a
financial institution to make oral loan commitments to new customers. Ac-
cordingly, breach of loan commitment cases invariably will arise with a pro-
longed relationship as a backdrop. Presumably, customers will be less
justified in depending on oral commitments when financial institutions pro-
vide the new notices required under the Statute of Frauds. Nonetheless, if
courts ignore the unenforceability of the underlying contract in order to im-
pose liability based on promissory estoppel, then the protections intended to
be provided by the amendments to the Statute of Frauds could prove
illusory.
4. Deceptive Trade Practices Act
The Legislature also amended the DTPA to provide that any consumer,
not merely a business consumer, may waive the protections afforded by the
DTPA if the consumer:
(a) is not in a significantly disparate bargaining position,
(b) is represented by an attorney in obtaining goods (other than the con-
sumer's principal residence) or services in exchange for consideration, paid
or to be paid, that exceeds $500,000, and
(c) expressly waives application of the DTPA, in a written contract, exe-
cuted by both the consumer and his attorney.249
B. Supervision and Regulation
L Enforcement
a Director Qualification
Section three of Senate Bill 962 amends the Texas Banking Code to pro-
hibit an individual from serving as a director of a state bank if the bank has
246. No. C14-86-00834-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 6, 1989) (not yet
reported).
247. Id. During the course of dealing between the parties, ANB had made and honored
various oral loan commitments.
248. Id.
249. Tex. S.B. 437, 71st Leg. (1989).
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charged off any of his obligations to the bank.250 Previously, the statute only
disqualified directors when the bank held a charged off note.251 A director
now becomes disqualified when the obligation is charged off even if the di-
rector has fully complied with the terms of his agreement. 252
b. Removal
The Commissioner's authority to remove individuals from their positions
with a state bank has been significantly expanded. The Commissioner may
serve notice of his intention to remove any individual who has violated a
cease and desist order, committed certain unsafe or unsound banking prac-
tices at the bank, caused a "substantial financial loss or other damage" to
another bank or "business institution, '253 demonstrated "personal dishon-
esty or a wilful or continuing disregard" for the other institution's safety or
has demonstrated that he is unfit to continue serving the bank.254 The per-
son then has ten days to respond to the notice or the removal action becomes
final.255 Previously, the statute appeared to prevent a person from being
removed unless the Commissioner first gave him written notice detailing the
offensive conduct, presented his conclusions at a meeting of the bank's board
of directors, and determined that such person was continuing to engage in
the impermissible activities. 256 Now, however, the Commissioner is empow-
ered to issue an order immediately suspending a person from service.257
c. Conservatorship
The Legislature amended the Texas Banking Code to provide that the
prior appointment of a supervisor for the bank is not a prerequisite for the
appointment of a conservator. The statute had stated that the Commissioner
could appoint a conservator if, "[a]fter the period of supervision," the Com-
missioner made certain determinations. 258 Now, the Commissioner may ap-
point a conservator, at any time, if he determines the bank to be in an unsafe
condition and "immediate and irreparable harm is threatened to the bank,
its depositors or stockholders, or the public .... ,,259
250. Tex. S.B. 962, 71st Leg. (1989).
251. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-405 (Vernon 1988).
252. Tex. S.B. 962, 71st Leg. (1989).
253. Presumably, the Commissioner could seek to remove an individual if the conduct that
gave rise to grounds for removal occurred at a savings and loan association because the term
"business institution," would include savings and loan associations.
254. Tex. S.B. 962, 71st. Leg. (1989).
255. Id.
256. TEx. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-412 (Vernon Supp. 1990); see also Tex. S.B. 962, 71st
Leg. (1989) (Report of Financial Institution Committee). "The Banking Code appeared to
require that an offending officer or director has violated a valid Cease and Desist Order before
a removal action can be initiated." Id.
257. Tex. S.B. 962, 71st Leg. (1989).
258. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT ANN. art. 342-801a, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1990).




a. Change of Domicile
The Legislature also authorized state banks to change their domicile, upon
consent of the Commissioner, to any location where that bank operates a
branch. 26° Previously, the change of domicile provisions for state banks
mirrored the National Bank Act,261 and thus, prohibited state banks from
moving their domicile more than thirty miles.262 The amendment provides
state banks with flexibility in light of the advent of statewide branching in
Texas. Conversely, national banks domiciled in Texas are still subject to the
thirty mile restriction.
b. Identification of Branch Facilities
In order to avoid public confusion, state and national banks must identify
their branch facilities.263 Signs and bank documents in use on or before Sep-
tember 1, 1989, must comply with this new article of the Texas Banking
Code before June 1, 1990.264 A six-month extension may be granted in case
of hardship.265
3. Resolution of Failing and Failed Savings and Loan Associations
The Legislature has enhanced the flexibility of state regulators to respond
to potential or actual failures of savings and loan associations. The Texas
Savings and Loan Commissioner (the S&L Commissioner) may approve a
merger for an association in an unsafe condition if he believes approval is in
the best interest of all concerned parties.266 Similarly, the legislature
adopted a new provision that authorizes the S&L Commissioner to approve
an application if he determines that the transaction's benefit to the public
outweighs any anticompetitive effects. 267 Previously, the S&L Commis-
sioner could not approve a merger or reorganization if the transaction failed
to meet any one of seven statutory considerations.268
4. Reorganization of the Finance Commission
The Finance Commission oversees the state authorities that regulate fi-
260. Id.
261. 12 U.S.C. § 30(b) (1988).
262. TEX. RaV. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-314 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
263. Tex. S.B. 1001, 71st Leg. (1989). State banks and national banks are prohibited from
using any:
form of advertising, including a sign or printed or broadcast material, that im-
plies or tends to imply that a branch facility is a separately chartered or organ-
ized bank. A sign at a branch facility and all official bank documents, including
checks, cashier's checks, loan applications, and certificates of deposit, must bear
the name of the principal bank and if a separate branch name is used must
identify the facility as a branch.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Tex. S.B. 607, 71st Leg. (1989).




nancial institutions. Traditionally, the Finance Commission consisted of
three separate divisions, one for banks, savings and loan associations, and
consumer credit firms.269 Basically, the Finance Commission served as an
advisory board. 270 In 1989, the Legislature eliminated this division struc-
ture within the Finance Commission.271
The Finance Commission now consists of nine individuals: two bank ex-
ecutives, two savings and loan association executives, and five individuals,
including one certified public accountant not employed in the banking indus-
try.272 The Finance Commission is authorized to hire an executive director
and staff personnel to aid in the conduct of the Commission's affairs.273 An-
other change is that the Finance Commission now must hold at least six
regular public meetings, instead of the prior minimum of two, each year.274
The duties of the Finance Commission have not been materially changed.
Instead, the Legislature is apparently attempting to provide the Finance
Commission with the tools to perform its duties. Interestingly, the Legisla-
ture required the Finance Commission to study merging the Banking De-
partment, the Savings and Loan Department, and the Office of the
Consumer Credit Commissioner.275
III. CONCLUSION
In 1989, the banking industry in Texas continued to experience the dra-
matic and wrenching changes that have been the hallmark of the last few
years. This survey reflects these developments. We can expect more of the
same next year. Already, two new questions have been raised that will sig-
nificantly affect the future course of banking law: (i) how will the Resolution
Trust Company resolve the dozens of failed Texas thrift institutions and
dispose of the billions of dollars in real estate and other assets under its
control, and (ii) how will the Federal bank regulatory agencies administer
the powers and the dictates contained in FIRREA? Undoubtedly, the an-
swers to these questions and others will transform the business of banking
and banking law during the 1990s.
269. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN art. 342-103 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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